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CORPORATIONS, VEILS, AND 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
Ronald C. Slye* 
INTRODUCTION 
When should a corporate entity itself be held criminally liable for vio-
lations of international law? It is well settled that corporate actions are, 
and should be, subject to international regulation and that international 
criminal law applies to individual corporate employees just as it applies 
to other private, non-state individuals. Still, the issue of corporate crimi-
nal liability for international law violations remains unresolved. Corpora-
tions are not presently subject to criminal liability under international 
law. Interestingly, business entities have been subject to domestic crimi-
nal prosecution for centuries in some states1 and such liability is rela-
tively uncontroversial. There is no reason that the same form of account-
ability at the international level should be viewed differently.2 This Arti-
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 1. In fact, corporate criminal liability is found as early as 1670 in France, though it 
was removed after the French revolution, only to be reimposed in the late nineteenth 
century with industrialization. For a brief summary of some of the history of corporate 
criminal liability in domestic legal systems, see Andrew Weissman & David Newman, 
Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 417–23 (2007) (focusing on 
history in common law countries). 
 2. Some argue against holding the corporate entity criminally liable under interna-
tional law, using the same arguments that were offered at Nuremberg and Tokyo in favor 
of holding state officials, rather than the state itself, liable for aggression, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. See, e.g., Joseph F.C. DiMento & Gilbert Geis, Corporate 
Criminal Liability in the United States, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LEGAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 159, 160–61 (Stephen Tully ed., 2007) (noting that individuals, not 
states, are held criminally liable for violations of international criminal law; also noting 
that heads of family are not held responsible for criminal acts of family members). Such 
arguments assume that if one holds the corporation criminally liable one cannot also hold 
individual corporate employees liable. As I note below, I argue that the one (holding the 
entity liable) does not preclude the other (holding individuals liable). Arguments for 
holding states liable for violations of international criminal law do not assume that indi-
viduals cannot still also be held criminally liable. Oppenheim, for example, notes that the 
responsibility of the state is different than the responsibility of the individual. The state’s 
responsibility for the acts of one of its nationals is not “vicarious responsibility stricto 
sensu. The state is in international law not legally responsible for the act itself, but for its 
own failure to comply with obligations incumbent upon it in relation to the acts of the 
private person: those acts are the occasion for the state’s responsibility for its own wrong-
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cle draws upon two different strands of scholarship to illustrate this the-
sis: corporate accountability under international law3 and corporate 
criminal liability in domestic legal systems.4 
This Article briefly outlines below some general arguments concerning 
corporations as proper objects of international criminal law. Though this 
issue appears to have received little attention in international criminal 
law circles, it has been the subject of a rich and varied conversation in 
academia, the courts, and legislatures throughout the world. The central 
inquiry is: under what circumstances should criminal liability be imposed 
on a collective corporate entity, and what does it mean to hold an entity 
itself criminally liable? This Article does not tackle all aspects of these 
questions. Rather, it highlights what are arguably the most important is-
sues raised by any proposal to hold a corporation criminally liable and 
draws analogies between efforts to hold corporate entities criminally li-
able for international law violations and recent international human 
rights and criminal law jurisprudence. International human rights and 
international criminal law have yet to address directly the question of 
corporate criminal liability. They have, however, developed some juris-
prudence concerning the actions of collectives and groups that provides 
useful insights into how, and under what circumstances, it might be ap-
propriate to hold a corporate entity criminally liable under international 
law. 
This Article argues for a move to reassert the veil of organizational re-
sponsibility for international crimes—an effort that parallels arguments 
in favor of holding sovereign states criminally liable.5 Historically, re-
sponsibility at the international level focused on the state rather than on 
individual state officials. Though not the first to break this mold, the 
                                                                                                             
ful acts, not the basis of its responsibility.” OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 501 n.13 
(Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts, eds., 9th ed. 1997). 
 3. See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45 (2002) (discussing corporate accountabil-
ity generally under international law, including civil and criminal liability). 
 4. See, e.g., CELIA WELLS, CORPORATIONS AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 
2001); Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior 
Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979) [hereinafter Corporate 
Crime]. 
 5. This Article does not address the question of whether states should be held crimi-
nally liable for international law violations or the implications of such liability. Most 
academic discussion concerning whether to hold states liable for their actions focuses on 
civil liability. This is not surprising insofar as a number of courts have indeed held states 
civilly liable for their wrongful acts. Parallels between sovereign state accountability and 
corporate accountability are worthy of exploration, though this Article does not undertake 
that inquiry. 
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Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals irrevocably established the proposition 
that individuals can be held responsible for violating international law, 
even if their acts are committed on behalf of a state. In other words, Ger-
man and Japanese officials who ordered and implemented an aggressive 
war and crimes against humanity could not hide behind the structure of 
the state, but could be held individually, and criminally, responsible for 
their official acts. The veil of sovereignty was thus pierced. In one of the 
most quoted phrases from its judgments, the Nuremberg Tribunal as-
serted the importance of prosecuting individuals: “Crimes against inter-
national law are committed by men, not abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of in-
ternational law be enforced.”6 
In domestic corporate law, it is generally accepted that individual cor-
porate officials and employees may be held liable for wrongful acts 
committed in a corporate capacity. Like their counterparts in the public 
sector, individual corporate officials are not immunized behind the veil 
of their organization. Yet, there is support for the idea that the corpora-
tion itself should be held liable for certain actions—many domestic juris-
dictions have imposed criminal liability on corporations for decades, and 
in some cases centuries. These prosecutions have all occurred under do-
mestic law, and have involved violations of, inter alia, environmental, 
labor, tort, and anti-trust law.7 However, international law has not been 
applied in similar circumstances to impose criminal liability. This Article 
will explore whether we should hold a corporate entity criminally liable 
for violations of international law, with particular attention to three ques-
tions. First, why should the corporate entity, as distinct from corporate 
officials and employees, be held criminally liable? Second, under what 
circumstances should criminal liability be imposed upon a corporate en-
tity? Finally, what penalties are appropriate for a corporation criminally 
                                                                                                             
 6. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (Oct. 1, 
1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 221 (1947). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2002) (conviction of 
corporation under the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Clean Water Act); People v. 
O’Neil, 550 N.E.2d 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (corporation criminally convicted for death 
of its employee); United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1983) (hold-
ing that a corporation can be held criminally liable for employees’ violations of antitrust 
laws). See also David N. Cassuto, Crime, War and Romanticism: Arthur Anderson and 
the Nature of Entity Guilt, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 179, 228–29 (2006) (discussing 
unsuccessful prosecution of Ford Motor Company for reckless homicide on theory that 
Ford failed to warn consumers regarding fire risks related to the design of the vehicle). 
For additional discussion, see Judy K. Broussard, Note, The Criminal Corporation: Is 
Ohio Prepared for Corporate Criminal Prosecutions for Workplace Fatalities?, 45 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 135 (1997). 
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convicted of an international crime? Before turning to these questions, 
Part I briefly addresses whether corporations are subject to international 
criminal law at all. 
I. BACKGROUND: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CORPORATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While there is some debate concerning whether corporations are or 
should be subject to regulation under international law,8 this Article pro-
ceeds as though they are and should be. There is no question that corpo-
rations enjoy rights under international law, including rights under inter-
national human rights treaties.9 Two examples illustrate this point. Cor-
porations have rights under the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms10 and have brought claims 
before the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) alleging that 
these rights have been violated.11 Corporations may also bring interna-
tional claims against the United States, Mexico, and Canada under the 
North American Free Trade Agreement.12 
Corporations are also subject to obligations under international law, 
both directly and indirectly. For example, liability was imposed directly 
on ship “owners”—usually corporations—as early as 1969 under the In-
ternational Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage.13 
Indirect obligations are suggested by the broad language found in the 
                                                                                                             
 8. For a brief introduction to some of the debate, and a criticism of the direct versus 
indirect distinction I adopt here, see Carlos M. Vazquez, Direct vs. Indirect Obligations 
of Corporations Under International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 927 (2005). 
 9. Initially corporations were more likely to assert their rights—usually concerning 
property rights against foreign governments—before ad hoc claims commissions. Prior to 
the development of commissions before which corporations could appear, corporations, 
like other private individuals, relied upon states to espouse their claims. Charles M. Spof-
ford, Third Party Judgment and International Economic Transactions, 3 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 116, 177–81 (1964) (giving examples of corporations using international arbitra-
tion mechanisms against other entities, including states). 
 10. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 11. See, e.g., Agrotexim and Others v. Greece, 330 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (ser. A) (1996) 
(holding that in fact the company, and not its shareholders, is the proper rights holder); 
The Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).  
 12. North American Free Trade Agreement arts. 1115–1138, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 13. The Treaty has been amended numerous times, most thoroughly with a Protocol 
in 1992. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the Establish-
ment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 27, 
1992, 1953 U.N.T.S. 330. None of these amendments have changed the fact that owners 
of ships, who usually are corporations, are liable for damages arising from oil pollution. 
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preamble to the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which states that “every individual and every organ of society” has an 
obligation to promote respect for the rights in the declaration.14 Interna-
tional law also requires states to regulate their nationals, including corpo-
rations, thus imposing indirectly on corporations obligations rooted in 
international law.15 Sometimes in fulfillment of these obligations, and 
sometimes on their own initiative, states impose liability on their corpo-
rate nationals for acts committed outside of their territory.16 
Given that corporations clearly enjoy rights under international law, 
and insofar as corporations are already subject to liability under interna-
tional law, either directly or indirectly, it follows that corporations should 
be subject to certain duties and obligations under international criminal 
law. It would be illogical to grant corporations rights under international 
law, including international human rights law, while simultaneously al-
lowing them to avoid responsibility for the most egregious violations of 
that same body of law.17 
II. WHY HOLD THE CORPORATION LIABLE? 
Individual corporate officials and other employees may be held civilly 
and criminally liable for violations of international law. As early as Nur-
emberg, corporate officials were prosecuted for their involvement in 
                                                                                                             
 14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of course is not itself a source of binding international law. While it is 
clear that a good deal of the Declaration now reflects customary international law, this is 
less clear with respect to organizational liability. For the purposes of this Article, I do not 
take a position on this question. 
 15. See, e.g., Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal art. 4, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125; Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 
17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 (obligating state parties to exercise 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct of their nationals). 
 16. Thus the United States imposes criminal liability for bribery committed by U.S. 
nationals (both natural and legal) anywhere in the world. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1977 § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2008). The Australian Criminal Code Act of 1995 
criminalizes slavery, including “any transaction involving a slave.” Criminal Code  
Act, 1995, § 270 (1995) (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/ 
consol_act/cca1995115/sch1.html. 
 17. For a good summary of some of the arguments concerning the wisdom of impos-
ing liability on corporations under international law in both the civil and criminal context, 
see Stephens, supra note 3. 
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crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.18 The 
issue there was not the application of international law to corporations; 
rather, it was the application of international law to private non-state ac-
tors. There is no question that private non-state actors can be held liable 
for violations of international criminal law.19 
Given that individual employees of a corporation can be prosecuted for 
international criminal law violations (and, to paraphrase the Nuremberg 
judgment, it is people, not corporations, who commit crimes), what 
would be the benefit of prosecuting the corporate entity itself? Corpora-
tions, in addition to officials or other employees, should be held crimi-
nally liable for three reasons: (1) collective action is likely to result in 
greater harm than individual action; (2) the individual actions of each 
corporate employee may be insufficient to hold any one of them liable 
under international law, even though a wrong has clearly been commit-
ted; and (3) effective deterrence of collective actions requires systemic 
punishment.20 As will be discussed in detail in the following discussion, 
these three arguments are not alternatives, but instead build upon each 
other sequentially. The first recognizes that individuals acting collec-
tively can cause far more damage than any one individual acting alone. 
This observation is central to the definition of most international crimes, 
and is usually reflected in the chapeau element of each. The second fo-
cuses on a class of crimes that falls outside of the traditional international 
criminal law approach aimed at individual culpability. These are a subset 
of those crimes committed by collectives of individuals. The third posits 
that the primary way to address this subset of collective crimes is to hold 
the entity itself accountable, which will more effectively deter similar 
wrongdoing. Such organizational liability may decrease those collective 
crimes already captured by international criminal law. 
                                                                                                             
 18. See, e.g., The Zyklon B Case (Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others), 1 Law Rep. 
of Trials of War Criminals 93 (Brit. Mil. Ct. 1946) (holding German industrialists liable 
for the provision of Zyklon B to Nazi concentration camps). 
 19. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide art. IV, Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (private individuals may be 
liable for genocide). 
 20. Some might argue that if we hold the entity itself liable we should not also hold 
individual corporate employees liable. I do not adopt this position. There are important 
reasons for allowing prosecution of both the entity and individual employees, though in 
any one case a prosecutor may reasonably decide to only pursue one type of defendant. 
For my purposes here, however, I focus on the possibility of holding the entity liable 
independent of whether we also hold employees liable. 
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A. Collective Action Compared to Individual Action 
Corporations wield enormous power; they can, and have, caused sig-
nificant harms. In addition to wielding enormous economic power,21 cor-
porations increasingly engage in state-like activity as a result of the pri-
vatization of traditional state functions (e.g., the management of prisons, 
public welfare programs, public utilities, and wars) and the tendency of 
corporations to elect to operate in environments where state power is 
weak or non-existent. 
The rise of the corporation is analogous to the rise of the modern na-
tion-state—both unite individuals for a common purpose, and both result 
in entities with an enormous potential for good or ill. The modern human 
rights movement arose out of a desire to protect the individual from the 
misuse of power by the modern state, an entity that also provided, and 
continues to provide, enormous benefits to modern society. While there 
are significant differences between states and private business corpora-
tions, the concern for the protection of individual rights and well-being 
that arose in response to the concentration of power in the state similarly 
applies to the concentration of power in the corporation. 
International criminal law recognizes the special nature of violations 
committed by organized groups. The four major international crimes—
war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and aggression—all re-
quire collective action.22 The chapeau element of two of these four 
crimes incorporates a collective action requirement.23 The third, geno-
cide, does not expressly require collective action, though in practice 
genocide usually involves collective action.24 The fourth, aggression, 
                                                                                                             
 21. The annual revenues of the wealthiest corporations exceed the gross domestic 
product of all but the wealthiest countries. See Jonathan Clough, Not-So-Innocents 
Abroad: Corporate Criminal Liability for Human Rights Abuses, 2005 AUSTL. J. HUM. 
RTS. 1 (citing to studies showing that close to half of the largest economies in the world 
are those of multinational corporations). 
 22. The one major exception to this is torture, which can be committed by a lone state 
official. There is also some question whether genocide could be committed by one per-
son. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICT-96-4-T, Judgment n.61 (Sept. 2, 
1998) (“a person could be found guilty of genocide without necessarily having to estab-
lish that genocide had taken place throughout the country concerned”). 
 23. For example, International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Statute article 7 requires a 
“widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population” for crimes 
against humanity and article 8’s definition of war crimes requires a plan, policy, or large-
scale commission of such crimes. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
arts. 7, 8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/ 
statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 24. But see supra note 23, raising the question of whether a person acting alone could 
commit genocide. 
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requires state involvement.25 This recognition of the power of collectives 
has not, however, lead to the assertion of international criminal jurisdic-
tion over entities, including corporations. Instead, the response has been 
to increase individual criminal liability for individuals who participate in 
such widespread or systemic crimes. We thus attribute to the individual 
the actions of other individuals that are part of the collective organiza-
tion.26 This Article does not argue against such a flow of responsibility, 
but instead maintains that responsibility should likewise flow in the other 
direction, from the individual to the organization. 
B. Individual Actions May Be Insufficient to Impose Liability 
While international criminal law has addressed the collective nature of 
these crimes by enhancing individual criminal liability, it fails to ade-
quately capture all crimes committed by a group, especially formal or-
ganizations. For example, individuals may suffer a harm committed by a 
corporation, but no single person has acted with the requisite mens rea 
and actus reus to be held criminally liable. Even if there is no question 
that a harm has been committed by a collective, we can not hold any one 
individual criminally liable for that harm if the elements of the crime are 
not satisfied. In other words, individual actions may not trigger individ-
ual liability, but in the aggregate they may add up to a criminal act. 
The notion that the whole may be greater than the sum of its parts with 
respect to liability is not new. Charles Abbott observed as long ago as 
1936 that “a corporation has a personality of its own distinct from the 
personalities which compose it, a ‘group personality’ different from and 
greater than . . . the sum of its parts;”27 and “[i]n the same way that a 
house is something more than a heap of lumber and an army something 
more than a mob . . . a corporate organization is something more than a 
number of persons.”28 
                                                                                                             
 25. See generally U.N. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 17, 
1974). Article 5.1(d) of the Rome Statute places the crime of aggression within the juris-
diction of the ICC, however, parties have not yet agreed on an operative definition. Rome 
Statute, supra note 23, arts. 5.1–5.2. 
 26. This was in fact the general approach adopted in the negotiations for the Rome 
Treaty creating the ICC, which rejected a proposal to include juridical persons within the 
court’s jurisdiction. See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under Interna-
tional Criminal Law over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an In-
ternational Criminal Court, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 139, 145 (M. Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000) (noting that the 
Rome Statute incorporates the idea of “criminalizing the individual participation in a 
crime committed by a collective entity”). 
 27. CHARLES ABBOTT, THE RISE OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 2 (1936). 
 28. Id. at 15. 
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Collective action and organization theory makes clear that organiza-
tional decisions do not necessarily reflect the preference of any individ-
ual within the organization. Instead, organizations often reach a decision 
through a process of bargaining and concessions among different interest 
groups.29 Group decisions may be determined as much by the structure of 
the decision-making process as by the individual or collective prefer-
ences of individuals. Voting theorists have known this for a while—the 
structure of a voting process has a strong influence on the outcome of a 
particular vote, thus alterations in the voting process may lead to oppos-
ing decisions even though the preferences of individual voters remains 
the same.30 This suggests something akin to a collective or institutional 
responsibility that is more than the aggregated responsibility of each in-
dividual who makes up the organization. 
C. Effective Deterrence Requires Systemic Punishment 
Holding individual corporate officials and employees criminally liable 
may not adequately deter certain corporate wrongdoing and harms and 
there may not be sufficient individual culpability to successfully prose-
cute any one individual. If harms result from the collective action of in-
dividuals whose individual acts are not themselves blameworthy, how 
does one establish accountability for those harms? How does one express 
societal disapproval, deter future such harms, and rehabilitate the wrong-
doer? When it comes to organizational actions that result in harm, sanc-
tioning the entity itself will be more effective in influencing behavior 
than prosecuting isolated individuals. If the harm one seeks to deter is 
created by the aggregation of individual acts that are otherwise innocent 
(or at least not clearly culpable), or if the harm is created by a policy, 
system, or decision-making process, placing accountability on the aggre-
gate actor rather than individual actors will create more effective deter-
rence. A focus on holding the corporation responsible is more likely to 
result in systemic reforms that may be necessary to prevent future harms 
than is a focus on individual criminal behavior. 
                                                                                                             
 29. See, e.g., MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL 
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 33 (1986) (discussing and citing to some of the 
literature on organizational theory). 
 30. See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (Yale 
Univ. Press 1963) (1951) (one of the major contributors to a complex understanding of 
voting theory and how, among other things, voting systems influence outcomes). Com-
pare to the school of interest group theory, which also attempts to explain collective pref-
erences and outcomes, and is most often associated with George Stigler. See George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
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III. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD AN ENTITY BE HELD 
LIABLE? 
When an act or result should be imputed to a corporation and trigger 
criminal liability is a question that many domestic jurisdictions have ad-
dressed. There are four general approaches to determine when an act 
should be attributed to a corporation for purposes of criminal liability. In 
the first approach, which derives from the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, the act of any employee is attributed to the corporation. This theory 
has been adopted in U.S. law, in which the Supreme Court has held that a 
corporation can be criminally liable when an employee commits a crime 
within the scope of her employment and, in some variations, with the 
intent to benefit the corporation.31  
Typically, liability is imposed if the individual was acting within the 
scope of the authority of the corporation and consistent with the powers 
delegated to that specific individual. But, suppose an employee acts out-
side her authority or contrary to an internal policy. Under Canadian law, 
a corporation cannot cite to an internal rule that prohibits the act as a de-
fense.32 U.S. law is similar, finding corporate liability for the act of a 
corporate employee even if there is a specific internal rule prohibiting the 
act.33 Not allowing the corporation to cite its internal rules as a defense 
creates a heightened incentive for the organization to ensure that its rules 
are enforced; it also precludes a company from avoiding liability when it 
prohibits certain activity on paper but allows it in practice. 
Most jurisdictions preclude corporate liability for the acts of employees 
that were not intended to, or do not, benefit the organization, such as em-
bezzlement.34 In the human rights context, one might ask if a corporation 
should be held liable if an employee assists in, for example, a war crime 
and the corporation is harmed by that involvement through adverse pub-
licity. On the one hand, it seems unfair to hold the corporation liable for 
an unsanctioned act that harms its public image. On the other hand, if the 
corporation does not have clear processes in place to prevent, or detect 
and punish, such activities, holding the corporation liable may create an 
incentive to implement such controls, thus furthering deterrence. 
                                                                                                             
 31. In the United States, imputing the mental state of a corporate officer to the corpo-
ration was first established by statute (the Elkins Act), which was upheld by the Supreme 
Court. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909). See 
also United States v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938); Standard Oil Co. v. United 
States, 307 F.2d 120, 125 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 32. See, e.g., Dredge v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 (Can.). 
 33. See United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir 1979). 
 34. See, e.g., Corporate Crime supra note 4, 1250 n.34 (citing to U.S. cases requiring 
benefit to corporation). 
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In the second approach to corporate criminal liability, only acts of cer-
tain high level officers or managers are attributed to the corporation. The 
focus of this approach is on the acts of the “brains” of the organization—
in other words, only those acts committed by employees with decision-
making authority are attributed to the organization and may trigger or-
ganizational liability. The acts of low-level employees—the “hands” or 
“labor” of the organization—will not be attributed to the corporation.35 
One of the foremost authorities on corporate criminal liability, Celia 
Wells, criticizes this approach. She warns that the distinction between 
brains and labor is a rhetorical device that “has been used to justify the 
class structure, educational inequalities, and the division of labour be-
tween manual and intellectual worker.”36 However, the fact that some 
have used the distinction between intellectual and physical abilities to 
justify discriminatory treatment does not mean that such distinctions are 
either inaccurate as a descriptive matter or that they are not useful in 
some contexts. Within the context of corporate criminal liability, and 
certainly within the context of international criminal law, there is value 
in distinguishing between the brains of an operation and those who 
merely execute. In fact, international criminal law generally emphasizes 
a preference for prosecuting those at the highest level of responsibility 
rather than “foot soldiers.”37 
Crucial to this second approach is the determination of what acts will 
in fact be attributed to the brains of a corporation. This question is not 
                                                                                                             
 35. See, e.g., id. at 1242 (setting forth this theory in the context of U.S. jurispru-
dence). See also Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153 (H.L.) (United 
Kingdom adopting this approach). 
 36. WELLS, supra note 4, at 154. 
 37. See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea art. 1, amended Oct. 27, 2004, Royal Decree No. NS/RKM/1004/006  
(Cambodia), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/law/4/KR_Law_as_ 
amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf (“The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior lead-
ers . . . and those who were most responsible . . . .”). See International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 [ICTY], Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence, Rule 11bis, May 30, 2006, IT/32/Rev. 38 (encouraging referral 
to state courts of prosecutions of low-level defendants). The moral philosopher Agnes 
Heller adopted the distinction between “evil” and “bad” people. Evil people are those 
who have decision-making power—they have a choice and choose evil. Bad people are 
those who are subordinate to evil people—they commit wrongful acts, but have less 
choice. Agnes Heller, The Natural Limits to Natural Law and the Paradox of Evil, in ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 149, 155–57 (S. Shute & S. Hurley eds., 1993). International criminal 
law has in fact adopted a similar distinction, emphasizing the importance of prosecuting 
leaders and architects over subordinates and “foot soldiers.” 
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unlike the question in international criminal law concerning the respon-
sibility of superiors for the acts of their subordinates, and in fact domes-
tic corporate criminal law adopts an approach similar to that adopted in 
international criminal law. The United States Supreme Court has stated 
that an individual corporate officer may be held liable if he occupied a 
position of “responsibility and authority” and had the power to prevent 
the wrong through the exercise of the “highest standard of foresight and 
vigilance.”38 The Council of Europe adopted a similar position in a con-
vention concerning corruption, which imposes criminal liability on the 
corporate entity itself when an employee was convicted of a crime if the 
natural person had a “leading position and had a power of representa-
tion, or authority to take decisions, or authority to exercise control or 
where there has been lack of supervision by this natural person.”39 Under 
international criminal law, a similar standard exists with respect to mili-
tary superiors. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”) states that a superior is liable for the acts of his subor-
dinate “if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was 
about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish 
the perpetrators thereof.”40 Military commanders thus can be held liable 
for the acts of their subordinates if they had actual knowledge or if they 
were negligent in not discovering such knowledge.41 
The Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) adopts two dif-
ferent standards for military and civilian superiors with respect to re-
sponsibility for the acts of their subordinates. For military superiors the 
standard is the “knew or should have known” standard like that articu-
lated in the ICTR Statute.42 For civilians, the standard is that the superior 
either knew or “consciously disregarded information” that indicated the 
                                                                                                             
 38. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672–74 (1975). 
 39. See Clapham, supra note 26, at 153 n.26 (discussing the Council of Europe’s 
Criminal Convention on Corruption). 
 40. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] art. 6(3), S.C. 
Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
 41. Not all articulations of superior responsibility in the military context adopt this 
negligence standard. Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for example, states that 
a military superior is liable “if they knew, or had information which should have enabled 
them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going 
to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power 
to prevent or repress the breach.” Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
art. 86(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. The ICTR standard more accurately reflects 
current international law on the issue. 
 42. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 28(a). 
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subordinate was acting criminally.43 This is a weaker standard than that 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the corporate criminal 
context, which is more like the test for military officers—it creates an 
incentive for the superior to search out information (compare “highest 
standards of foresight and vigilance” with “had reason to know”). In con-
trast, the ICC civilian standard does not create any such incentive be-
cause liability attaches if the superior consciously disregards available 
information. 
The final two approaches to determining when an act should be attrib-
uted to a corporation for purposes of criminal liability take a more holis-
tic approach to the corporate entity. A study of corporate criminal liabil-
ity in the late 1970s noted the prevalence of jury cases in which a corpo-
ration was found criminally liable even though all of the individual cor-
porate officers were acquitted.44 Such verdicts suggest a theory of liabil-
ity in which the whole is greater than the sum of its parts45—that in some 
cases, even though no one individual is clearly culpable for a criminal act 
(or juries feel uncomfortable holding them criminally responsible), 
someone, in this case the entity, should bear responsibility. 
The third approach focuses on the procedures, policies, and culture of 
the corporation. This approach is the most collective, focusing on the 
corporation as an entity. It analogizes the internal mental processes of an 
individual with the internal organizational policies of a corporation. 
There are two variations of this approach. The first would require that 
one show that the procedures and practices of the corporation created the 
wrongful conduct—i.e., that there is a causal connection between corpo-
rate policies and the wrongful activity.46 The second would require that 
one show how the procedures or policies did not and could not prevent 
such activity.47 This second variation places a higher burden on the cor-
                                                                                                             
 43. Id. art. 28(b). 
 44. Corporate Crime, supra note 4, at 1248. 
 45. Of course an equally plausible, and in fact more likely, explanation is the desire of 
a jury to hold someone accountable for a wrong, but the reluctance to criminally punish 
any one individual. It could be that there is not enough evidence to attribute morally 
wrongful behavior to any one individual, but recognition that individual acts resulted in a 
harm that should be remedied. 
 46. This is the approach adopted by the United Kingdom in the recently enacted Cor-
porate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, which provides that a corporate entity 
may be liable for manslaughter if “the way in which its activities are managed or organ-
ized by its senior management is a substantial element in the breach [of a relevant duty 
owed by the corporation].” Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, 
c. 19, § 1(3) (U.K.). 
 47. For further articulation and examples of the two variations of this approach, see 
Corporate Crime, supra note 4, at 1243. The author articulates three different theories of 
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porate entity, increasing the collective responsibility of the corporation 
for the individual acts of its employees. This variation is similar to other 
areas of the law under which individuals may lose important interests if 
they do not take reasonable precautions, such as one finds in the doc-
trines of adverse possession with respect to real property and due dili-
gence in the case of lost personal property.48 Under U.S. securities laws, 
corporate officers can be held liable for “knowingly fail[ing] to imple-
ment a system of internal accounting controls” that meet a minimum set 
of standards for corporate accounting transparency and control.49 Such a 
theory is not completely foreign to international human rights law. In 
McCann v. United Kingdom, a case brought against the United Kingdom 
for the killing of suspected IRA terrorists in Gibraltar, the ECHR con-
cluded that the individuals who killed the suspects were not responsible 
for the deaths because they acted reasonably given what they were told 
by their superiors.50 The court did, however, find that those who organ-
ized the operation were responsible for the deaths, and that the killings 
thus violated the right to life of the suspects because the design of the 
operation made it highly likely that the operatives in the field would 
shoot to kill in almost all circumstances.51 In other words, it was the 
overall design of the operation that was found to have caused the deaths, 
rather than the individual actions of the persons pulling the trigger. 
The fourth and last approach is similar to the third approach, but rather 
than looking at corporate systems, it aggregates the individual acts of 
various employees. Under this approach a corporation may be held liable 
for a crime even though the conduct of no one person satisfies all the 
elements of the crime. In other words, the actus reus and mens rea do not 
have to reside within the same person. Celia Wells offers an illustration 
of this approach: “[T]he question would not be whether employee X’s 
knowledge plus employee Y’s knowledge added up to recklessness . . . 
but whether, given the information held amongst a number of ‘responsi-
ble officers,’ it can be said that the corporation itself was reckless.”52 
Suppose, therefore, that employee X knows that a community of people 
                                                                                                             
corporate criminal liability. The third “proposes that a corporation is blameworthy only 
when its procedures and practices unreasonably fail to prevent corporate criminal viola-
tions,” and “a corporation is blameworthy when its practices and procedures are inade-
quate to protect the public from corporate crimes.” Id. 
 48. See 3 AM. JUR. 2d Adverse Possession § 43 (2008); 1 AM. JUR. 2d Abandoned, 
Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 32 (2008). 
 49. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (2008). 
 50. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 210–13 (1996). 
 51. Id. ¶ 211. 
 52. WELLS, supra note 4, at 156. 
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live near a dam. Employee Y enters into a contract with another company 
to destroy the dam, is under the impression that no individuals live near 
the dam, and informs the company of this fact. Under this approach the 
corporation of which X and Y are a part would be liable for the deaths 
caused by the destruction of the dam. (The company that actually de-
stroyed the dam may of course also be liable.) Note also that a focus on 
the communication system of the corporation might lead to a similar 
finding of liability under the third approach. For example, a trucking 
company was found liable for violating a federal regulation that prohib-
ited truckers from driving while ill. The driver had told the company’s 
dispatcher that he could not drive, but then changed his mind when in-
formed of the company’s policy concerning absences. The court con-
cluded that the corporate officers knew that the new policy they had im-
plemented would encourage drivers to drive while ill and thus they were 
responsible for their employee’s violation of that federal regulation.53 
This fourth approach raises some other interesting questions. For ex-
ample, could one aggregate across corporate entities? In other words, 
could one hold a collection of corporate entities (a joint venture for ex-
ample) criminally liable for certain activities even if it was not possible 
to hold any one individual corporate entity responsible? With respect to 
individual criminal liability, the third approach may suggest imposing 
liability on the individual or individuals who designed the decision-
making process or procedures of the organization, even if they were not 
directly involved in the actual decisions that resulted in the wrongful ac-
tivity. Just as we hold individuals or companies liable for defective de-
sign in the U.S. tort system, so too should those who create defective 
decision-making systems be held liable.54 As in the product liability con-
text, one would want to show at least negligence, if not actual knowledge 
and foreseeability, of the consequences of a systemic design flaw in a 
corporate decision-making system. 
IV. PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS 
Thus far this Article has suggested reasons for holding a corporate en-
tity criminally accountable for violations of international law and the 
circumstances under which we might want to do so. The next logical 
question is what does it mean to hold a corporation criminally liable? In 
other words, what penalty can be imposed on a corporate entity? Is the 
                                                                                                             
 53. See Corporate Crime, supra note 4, at 1249 (citing United States v. T.I.M.E.-
D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974)). 
 54. For an explanation of design defect liability, see TERRENCE F. KIELY & BRUCE L. 
OTTLEY, UNDERSTANDING PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 126 (2006). 
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penalty sufficiently different from non-criminal penalties (such as fines) 
to justify the higher burden of proof and additional procedural protec-
tions afforded to criminal defendants under both domestic and interna-
tional law? 
Penalties to consider are fines, restraints, structural injunctions, public-
ity, equity awards, and dissolution. Fines are the most common, but are 
also easily imposed through civil liability. One difference between 
criminal and civil fines is the criminal label attached to the former. This 
may result in increased deterrence, public shaming, and some satisfaction 
of a desire for retribution. There is some evidence that attaching the 
criminal label to a fine is viewed more seriously by the person being 
fined, and thus may have a greater deterrence value than civil fines.55 
Labeling a fine criminal and identifying an individual or entity as such 
publicly shames the individual or organization. This can be viewed as a 
weak form of punishment, a strong expression of public condemndation, 
or a weak form of retribution. 
A fine’s effectiveness is obviously dependent on its size. A small in-
significant fine risks having little, if any, impact on a corporation—it 
runs the danger of being just one additional cost of doing business. A 
fine that is too large, however, risks weakening the corporation in a way 
that may be detrimental to its legitimate business activities, and thus so-
cially wasteful. Of course, if the corporation’s main business is illegal, 
then such concerns are lessened or non-existent. There are various solu-
tions to the size problem. First, instead of setting a predetermined abso-
lute amount for a fine, the amount could be calculated as a percentage of 
corporate income, assets, or some other measure of economic size. The 
disadvantage of this approach is that the amount of the fine for the same 
wrongful activity will vary depending on the corporation’s size, which 
raises the problem of horizontal inequity. Second, the fine could be tied 
to the economic benefit the company derived from its illegal activity, 
such as the revenue or profits generated by the illegal activity. To em-
phasize its punitive nature, and to forestall the corporation from viewing 
the fine as an additional cost of doing business, the fine would have to be 
more than one hundred percent of the revenues or profits.56 
                                                                                                             
 55. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve? 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1497–1512 (1996) (discussing the reputational effect of crimi-
nal and civil sanctions on individuals and corporations, though concluding that in most 
cases involving corporations the stigma associated with criminal sanctions is similar to 
that of civil sanctions). For a discussion more sympathetic to the power of the stigma of 
corporate criminal sanctions, see Corporate Crime, supra note 4, at 1365. 
 56. While conceptually these two approaches are appealing, one should not underes-
timate the practical issues concerning the measurement of revenues and profits—
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Restraints, also sometimes referred to as incapacitation or probation, 
usually involve injunctions that prevent a corporation from engaging in a 
particular type of activity, either temporarily or permanently. A company 
could be prohibited from operating in a particular country or from engag-
ing in a particular activity in a country or region. For example, if a corpo-
ration involved in the resource extraction industry (i.e., oil, mining) is 
found complicit in a crime against humanity, the company could be pro-
hibited from operating in the country where the violations occurred. Al-
ternatively, the corporation could be placed on “probation” during which 
its activities would be monitored by a court or other independent 
agency.57 These probationary monitoring controls could be implemented 
and overseen by a domestic agency of the company’s place of incorpora-
tion (such as the U.S. Treasury Department or the Securities and Ex-
change Commission), an international organization (such as the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights or the International La-
bour Organization), non-governmental organizations (such as a consor-
tium of human rights organizations), or some combination thereof. 
A structural injunction may be used to restructure internal corporate 
systems and decision-making processes.58 This penalty is most effective 
when the basis of liability is systemic—and thus would be most appro-
priately paired with the third approach to corporate criminal liability de-
scribed above in Part III.59 
Adverse publicity orders require that a corporation publicly acknowl-
edge its wrongdoing.60 This can take the form of a simple acknowledg-
                                                                                                             
corporations have some discretion to inflate or deflate the reported measure of their eco-
nomic activity. Thus, to be effective, fines should be determined using an independent 
accounting mechanism. 
 57. See, e.g., 3 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
standard 18-3.14 (3d ed. 1994), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/ 
sentencing_blk.html#2.6 (contemplating probationary oversight as a response to corpo-
rate criminal conduct, though suggesting that such monitoring should not extend to “the 
legitimate ‘business judgment’ decisions of the organization’s management or its stock-
holders or delay such decisions”). 
 58. For a brief discussion of such a punitive injunction, see Brent Fisse & John 
Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: Individualism, Col-
lectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L. REV. 468, 501 (1988). 
 59. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. Such restructuring is contemplated 
in the United Kingdom’s newly enacted Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homi-
cide Act. Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19, § 9 (U.K.). 
 60. See Patrick Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability for Injuries and Death, 40 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1091, 1101 (1992) (discussing adverse publicity orders). See generally 
Brent Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against Business Corporations, 
8 MELB. U. L. REV. 107 (1971) (discussing and supporting adverse publicity orders). The 
United Kingdom’s recently enacted Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
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ment of wrongdoing (“Corporation X admits to having aided crimes 
against humanity in country Y”), but could also include more detail about 
the nature of the offense, details about other sanctions that may have 
been imposed, and the steps the corporation has taken to prevent future 
similar occurrences. The more detail and information required by such 
orders, the more likely it is that such orders will be viewed as punitive 
(and thus satisfy retributivists) and the more likely it is that they may 
lead to corporate reforms and contribute to deterrence. 
Equity awards consist of the issuance of new shares in the corporation 
to victims.61 In other words, victims of a corporate crime are given an 
ownership interest in the company. Such a penalty has two clear effects. 
First, by diluting the investment of existing shareholders it imposes a 
cost on the corporation’s owners. Second, it ties the economic well being 
of victims to the economic well being of the corporation. The first point I 
take to be uncontroversial. Imposing a cost on shareholders for corporate 
wrongdoing makes as much economic sense as allowing shareholders to 
benefit from a corporation’s legal activities.62 The second point high-
lights a potential drawback of this type of sanction. Some victims, and 
possibly many of them, would be offended by the idea of reaping an eco-
nomic benefit from a corporation that engaged, for example, in a crime 
against humanity of which they were the victims.63 
Dissolution is the corporate equivalent of capital punishment. It is a 
punishment usually reserved for those corporations whose primary pur-
pose is illegal. The U.S. Sentencing Commission contemplates such a 
punishment in cases where the corporation is not engaged in any legiti-
                                                                                                             
Act allows imposition of such adverse publicity orders. Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, c. 19, § 10 (U.K.) (granting the court power to make a 
“publicity order”). 
 61. See, e.g., New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Report 102 (2003),  
Sentencing: Corporate Offenders § 7 (discussing equity fines), available at 
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/r102chp07. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., 
“No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of 
Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 413 (1980) (proposing and discussing 
equity fines). 
 62. Holding shareholders accountable in this way assumes either that shareholders 
may be able to influence management (to make sure that they do not engage in illegal 
activity) or that they may easily learn of such activity allowing them to exit by selling 
their interest. With the exception of closely held corporations or large institutional inves-
tors, neither of these assumptions is clearly warranted. 
 63. One victim in South Africa, for example, told an interviewer that she would not 
want money from the person who killed her husband. She explained that if she used that 
money to buy a house, for example, the house would always remind her of her loss and of 
the perpetrator. Interview with Anonymous Victim, in Cape Town, S. Afr. (Nov. 28, 
2003). 
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mate business.64 While dissolution may provide some satisfaction, with-
out the imposition of criminal sanctions on individual officers or the in-
clusion of restraints on the future activity of the former officers, those 
same individuals could create a new corporation to engage in similar ac-
tivity. 
CONCLUSION 
While corporate criminal liability is controversial in the context of in-
ternational criminal law, it is widely accepted in many domestic legal 
systems. The purpose of this Article is to challenge this disconnect be-
tween domestic and international legal systems. In the course of this dis-
cussion, a number of issues have emerged that warrant further explora-
tion. First, those interested in imposing criminal liability on corporations 
for international crimes would benefit from the findings of those who 
study organizational systems and behavior. Such literature could assist in 
determining what actions are rightly attributed to the organization as well 
as how best to create incentives to alter organizational structures in a way 
that minimizes involvement with violations of international criminal law. 
Second, proponents of corporate criminal liability may draw insight from 
those who argue for the imposition of criminal liability on states, as well 
as other entities such as political parties or guerilla movements. Third, as 
suggested above, there is a good deal to learn from those who have stud-
ied corporate criminal liability within domestic legal systems—this is a 
field with a long and rich history. Fourth, and finally, there are some in-
teresting analogies, and even disconnects, between doctrines that have 
developed in international criminal law and those that have developed in 
domestic corporate criminal law.65 An increased attention to them may 
benefit both domestic and international legal systems. 
                                                                                                             
 64. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C1.1 (2003). 
 65. For example, the fact noted above that in the United States corporate officials are 
subject to a higher duty of responsibility (a knew or should have known standard) than 
civilian superiors under the ICC (knew or conscious disregard standard). These may be 
appropriate differences, but it is possible that such differences are not well known, and 
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